Take abortion, for example. In particular, consider cases where abortion is purely elective not medically necessary and the pregnancy was not due to unusual or tragic circumstances i. Is abortion in such cases morally wrong? People have debated the issue for decades, appealing to a wide range of facts and arguments. Occasionally, people switch sides, but usually they stick to their guns.
It is fair to say that there will not be a consensus in the foreseeable future. Significantly, whether people do come to an agreement on abortion does not seem to hinge on the resolution of any factual questions. Arguably, answers to the relevant factual questions e. Like the abortion issue, the WMD issue has a great political and often emotional impact, and there has been much debate about it. But in this case, people have come to a consensus. Why is this? A Subjectivist would explain this by saying that the WMD issue is factual, whereas the abortion issue is not factual.
The WMD issue concerns an empirical question that can be answered by going to Iraq and scouring the country for the alleged weapons. When the weapons are not found, this undermines the claim that the weapons were there. Of course, it is still possible, though unlikely, that the weapons were there.
They may just be very well hidden; or, as some have alleged, they may have been smuggled into Syria before the invasion.
The WMD claim is verifiable. It may not be easy to verify, but it is the sort of claim that can eventually be shown to be true or shown to be false with empirical evidence observation. But now consider the claim that elective abortion is morally wrong.
The Subjectivist would say that this is not verifiable. No amount of empirical investigation or argumentation can show the claim to be true or false. According to the subjectivist, this is because moral claims are not really claims at all. There are no moral facts: no moral truths and no moral falsehoods. There is some initial plausibility to this idea.
After all, it seems that if the abortion conflict were really a disagreement about a factual question, then the facts could be ascertained and people could come to agreement just as in the WMD case. But, it seems that all of the relevant facts about abortion have been ascertained while the conflict persists. If moral disagreements were about factual matters, then they could all be settled by answering factual questions.
Many moral disagreements persist even when answers to all of the relevant factual questions are known. Therefore, moral disagreements are not about factual matters. In other words, there are no moral facts. Simple Subjectivism is an attempt to capture the basic idea of Subjectivism. Simple Subjectivism implies that we are infallible or nearly infallible when making ethical statements. After all, we are in a privileged position when it comes to judging how we feel about the issues.
But our views can change, and we sometimes come to the conclusion that we were wrong about an ethical matter. All such conclusions are wrong, according to Simple Subjectivism. Note the similarity between this and some of the objections against Cultural Relativism.
If I say that X is wrong, and you say that X is right, then we are both just reporting our personal attitudes. Nefarious Jones will deactivate the robot himself if I chop off my own leg, but not otherwise. But here, it seems to me, is a conceptual truth about moral conscientiousness:.
But since it has to be possible that I both be morally conscientious and know the true moral theory on Tuesday morning in APPLE, it must not be the case that any plausible subjectivism is true.
Necessarily [a morally conscientious person, if she knows she is faced with a choice between doing something that will result in her doing nothing wrong ever and her doing something that will result in her acting horribly morally wrongly, she will be strongly motivated not to do the thing that will result in her acting horribly morally wrongly]. Therefore, it is possible that [it is not the case that [subjectivism is true]]. Necessarily, [if [it is possible that [it is not the case that [subjectivism is true]]], then [necessarily [it is not the case that [subjectivism is true]]].
From the necessary truth of whatever moral theory happens to be the true one. This is middle knowledge, and some think it is contentious that I could have it. Some deny that God has middle knowledge! I should also note, in passing, that the possibility of this kind of knowledge is presupposed by the actualism and possibilism debate in ethics.
If appealing to it there is fair game, so too should it be here. All of this notwithstanding, I believe an argument for the same conclusion, one without any loss of force, could be given that only made appeal to the probabilistic counterfactual knowledge I have about my own future actions.
Surely I know myself well enough to have some such knowledge about my future actual and counterfactual behavior! I assume for the purposes of this argument that consequentialism is false.
I also believe that consequentialism is false. Hi Peter, fun case! But for one who thought otherwise, the most I can see them concluding from this is that the subjective moral status of their future actions is deliberatively irrelevant.
Does that seem right? If Moral Subjectivism is correct, then a person cannot be wrong in their moral judgments. If my moral judgments reflect just my feelings and dispositions, then I cannot be mistaken in my moral judgments. After all, I am best familiar with my feelings. Yet, I can think of a few cases in which I have been wrong in my judgments because of my feelings and emotions. Thus, Subjectivism leads us to inconsistent judgments.
Moral Subjectivism prevents us from having a rational discussion on ethical issues. When people are led by their feelings there is very little communication on ethical issues. Moral Subjectivism is an inconsistent ethical theory. Our interactions with other people are inevitable and require some common understanding of what is right and what is wrong. The above difficulties ruin the appeal of Moral Subjectivism as a meta-ethical theory.
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