If a constitutional convention does not have a constitutional purpose, they should not be called as such. Historically , Collective Responsibility was developed in order to protect government from an interfering Monarch seeking to divide his ministers.
This purpose, however, is no longer relevant today as the UK is now firmly a constitutional monarchy whereby the role of the Monarch has been minimised in favour of ministers. Following this, the question arises as to whether there is a continued constitutional purpose for the Convention in the modern era.
If it is the case that Collective Responsibility only confers a right exclusively on the Prime Minister to have her ministers agree publicly with her policy and decisions, without any purported benefit to Parliament or the public, why should it matter constitutionally if her ministers refuse to do so and she is incapable of enforcing her right?
A better understanding of the modern Convention of Collective Responsibility, and one that I have made elsewhere , is that the purpose of the Convention is to provide a standard of behaviour — Cabinet solidarity — by which government and its suitability for office can be judged by both Parliament and the public.
After all, the Queen appoints as Prime Minister the person who can command the confidence of the House of Commons, and that person must maintain that confidence if they wish to remain as Prime Minister. Should a government instead appear divided, the House of Commons may reasonably conclude that it is no longer worthy of its confidence.
If so, as stipulated under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act , a vote of no confidence could be held, and a new alternative government could be formed either within a two week period or, if necessary, after a general election. This reading takes a wider view of the Convention than that by Marshall: it is not merely an entitlement of the Prime Minister, but a measure for the House of Commons.
On this reading of Collective Responsibility, it would be premature to say that the Convention is broken as a result of Brexit. Although some cabinet members abstained on the above-mentioned vote, and neither resigned nor were sacked as a result, this suggests only a minor modification of the Convention of Collective Responsibility whereby abstention removes the need for resignation. This indeed appears to have been the view of the government. Resignations by ministers who cannot publicly support government policy are ordinarily rare and exceptional, and the recent numbers have been unprecedented.
Despite technically abiding by the terms of the Convention, therefore, the large number of Brexit-related resignations nevertheless highlights a divided government. The exceptional number of recent resignations may be the basis for a withdrawal of support either by Parliament or the electorate. Compliance with the Convention, therefore, is just as important as non-compliance with the Convention in determining whether or not the government, in particular the Prime Minister, is still suitable to govern.
In conclusion, it is clear that a breakdown in Cabinet discipline during the Brexit process does not signal the demise of Collective Responsibility, but instead shows that the government has simply failed to maintain the standard of solidarity set by it.
This failure is demonstrated, not mitigated, by the sheer number of ministers who have resigned in accordance with the Convention. Brexit has divided politics, and thus the G overnment, in an unprecedented manner.
Both the House of Commons and the public are arguably just as divided as the G overnment on the issue, thus making any move against the Prime Minister as demonstrated in January less likely to succeed. Whether the upcoming elections to the European Parliament will change this remains to be seen. Due to pressure from within her own party, Theresa May also recently indicated that she may voluntarily step down as Prime Minister following a furth er vote on her Withdrawal Agreement in early June.
If so, the House of Commons, if not the electorate, will soon have to decide the person whom it has confidence in to form a new government. Collective Responsibility is still working, although our politics, at least for the time being, might not be. In short, people who want a courts service which is both detached from the burly burly of the political process and also fully "accountable" may be asking for the impossible.
The best compromise may be to appoint trusted people as members of the courts service and then to trust them, accepting whatever form of annual report they publish - without requiring anything further in the way of accountability. The other way of avoiding the broken backed doctrine of ministerial responsibility is to embrace some of the ideas emerging from the current "strategic management initiative" in the public service.
The central element, whose hour has come at last, involved an amendment to the Ministers and Secretaries Act in which prescribed tasks would be delegated to semi detached executive units, headed by senior civil servants. The programme of work would be carefully defined, criteria for success fixed and appropriate personnel provided.
Then the executive unit would be expected to get on with it with success rewarded and sanctions available for failure. IN THE context of the present confusion, it has to be said that the work such an executive unit would do would certainly not include the core functions of Government, such as appointing judges or removing them.
Equally, it seems likely that such powers would be the last to be relinquished to the courts service. Thus neither type of reform would have forestalled the present episode, unless perhaps by reducing the workload in the Department of Justice. There are two final points. In the first place the great fondness of our law for procedural rectitude obstructed the investigation by the Dail Committee in early into the fall of the Reynolds Government.
One hopes that history will not repeat itself. Secondly, it is asserted confidently that the courts service will be set up next week on a non statutory basis. This seems very precipitate. It would surely be better to wait until the service can be set up on a statutory basis, lest it take some decision which has been vested legally in the Minister for Justice and cannot be transferred without appropriate legal sanction.
In honour of Irish Times Food Month, a query into all manner of musical victuals. See a sample. Exclusive competitions and restaurant offers, plus reviews, the latest food and drink news, recipes and lots more.
Please update your payment details to keep enjoying your Irish Times subscription. Hard to replace Ministerial responsibility Fri, Nov 15, , One response, which Mrs Owen appears to adopt in this is to say she is "accountable" in that she must relay information and answer questions, but not "culpable" in the sense of being subject to a sanction if things go wrong.
TV, Radio, Web. Subscriber Only. Putting the Rabbit in the Hat by Brian Cox: ticking the boxes. What should any one of us be expected to do to avert climate catastrophe?
Music Quiz. The Books Podcast. Culture Videos. Sign up. Women writers Putting Irish women writers back in the picture.
Reach for the Stars: The best of Irish astrophotography. Murmurations over Lough Ennell. Sign In. Don't have an account?
0コメント